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THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTRAGROUP 
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY: A CRITICAL REVIEW 
LOURDES PERONI?
The story of religion is, in substantial part, the story of adaptation and re-
sponse to changing social worlds and, for centuries, the law has been one 
important figure in this dynamic history. Law has not just struggled with 
questions of religious freedom but has challenged religion to test the re-
siliency, complexity, and resources of its own traditions. An important 
challenge for contemporary human rights law is to ensure that it contin-
ues to encourage this dynamism rather than serving as a freezing agent. 
— Benjamin L. Berger1
INTRODUCTION
This Article examines ways in which one of the most established hu-
man rights courts—the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court” or 
“the Strasbourg Court”)—encourages or discourages intragroup religious 
diversity and dissent.2 The Strasbourg Court is thought to be one of the 
most robust systems of human rights protection in the world.3 Its voice is 
arguably one of the most influential human rights voices in the growing 
? Ph.D. Researcher, Faculty of Law of Ghent University, Belgium. I am grateful to Holning Lau and 
Saila Ouald Chaib for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this Article. The research for this 
work was conducted within the framework of the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant 
project entitled “Strengthening the European Court of Human Rights: More Accountability through 
Better Legal Reasoning.” 
 1. Benjamin L. Berger, Inducing Fundamentalisms: Law as a Cultural Force in the Domain of 
Religion, 9 CANADIAN DIVERSITY 25, 28 (2012).  
 2. Set up in 1959, the Strasbourg Court rules on alleged violations of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (“ECHR”) in a jurisdiction made up of eight hundred million people living in the 
forty-seven Council of Europe Member States that have ratified the ECHR. See EUR. CT. H.R. THE 
COURT IN BRIEF, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf.  
 3. See, e.g., Paul Johnson, An Essentially Private Manifestation of Human Personality: Con-
structions of Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67, 74 
(2010) (arguing that “the Court must be regarded as one of the most important discoursing machines in 
the world”); Anna Grear, Challenging Corporate “Humanity”: Legal Disembodiment, Embodiment and 
Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 511, 536 (2007) (arguing that the Court is “widely thought to be 
the most juridically mature of human rights regimes”); Peter G. Danchin & Lisa Forman, The Evolving 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Religious Minorities, in
PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 192 (Peter G 
Danchin & Elizabeth A. Cole eds. 2002) (arguing that the Court “has established itself as the most 
effective regional system for the protection of human rights in the world.”). 
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“transjudicial communication,”4 as wide reference to its precedents across 
the world attest.5
Yet when it comes to the protection of one of the fundamental free-
doms enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
freedom of religion, the Court’s track record is at best mixed.6 In fact, it 
took more than three decades for the Court to find the first freedom of reli-
gion violation in 1993.7 During those decades, it looked like the ECHR 
provision guaranteeing freedom of religion (Article 98) “was going to be 
effectively a dead letter.”9 Today, twenty years since the first Article 9 
violation, the Court’s increasing freedom of religion jurisprudence “has not 
translated into greater protection for religious individuals in many instanc-
es.”10
 4. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV.
99, 101 (1994-1995) (referring to the phenomenon of transjudicial communication as “communication 
among courts––whether national or supranational––across borders.”).  
 5. Both domestic and supranational courts refer to the European Court of Human Rights prece-
dents. See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], octubre 15, 1997, Sentencia T-
523/97 (Colom.) (citing Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978)); U.S. Supreme 
Court, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (citing Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) (1981)) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, González et al. v. Mexico, Prelimi-
nary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009) 
(citing Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria, App. No. 55523/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), available at
http://echr.ketse.com/doc/55523.00-en-20070726/view/ (unpublished Court (Fifth Section) decision)). 
 6. The Court has been criticized for offering inadequate protection to the individual exercise of 
freedom of religion. See, e.g., Javier Martínez-Torrón, The (Un)Protection of Individual Religious 
Identity in the Strasbourg Case Law, 1 OXFORD J. OF LAW AND RELIGION 1, 1 (2012) (arguing that the 
Court has not adequately protected individual religious identity expressed in ordinary life).  
 7. The Court found the first violation of Article 9 of the ECHR in Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). 
 8. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 9, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. “Eve-
ryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. Freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
 9. Carolyn Evans, Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human 
Rights: Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 321, 321 (2010-2011). 
 10. Id. In fact, the number of violations of freedom of religion violations remains strikingly small 
when compared with the amount of violations found under other rights guaranteed by the ECHR. The 
Court’s most recent table of violations reveals that, in the period of 1959-2012, the Court has found 
only forty six violations of freedom of religion. In the same period of time, the Court has found nine 
hundred and forty violations of the right to respect for private and family life; five hundred and twelve 
violations of freedom of expression; and a hundred and forty one violations of freedom of association 
and assembly. See EUR. CT H.R., VIOLATIONS BY ARTICLE AND BY RESPONDENT STATE (1959-2012), 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_1959_2012_ENG.pdf.  
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By all accounts, assumptions about religion underlying the Court’s 
understanding of the scope and content of freedom of religion11 may partly 
explain such an unfortunate state of affairs.12 To be sure, the ECHR, like 
many other human rights instruments, does not define religion.13 Moreover, 
the Court has not attempted a formal and comprehensive definition. Yet, at 
times, implicit assumptions about religion as a set of “theological proposi-
tions”14 to which people adhere and assumptions of orthodoxy about cer-
tain religious groups15 surface in the Court’s freedom of religion reasoning. 
In this Article I argue that, in sidelining religious practices that do not 
conform to religious orthodoxy, these sorts of assumptions may obscure 
and discourage diversity within religious groups. Incorporating insights 
from religious studies, I thus propose that the Court becomes more critical-
ly aware of these background assumptions about religion and about certain 
religious groups when assessing religious freedom claims. In particular, I 
suggest that the Court eschew assumptions of orthodoxy about religious 
groups when these assumptions fix and naturalize certain religious practic-
es as the defining ones for the entire group. 
My discussion proceeds as follows: I start by outlining one of the 
main ways in which the legal assessment of freedom of religion is usually 
framed and by formulating my inquiry differently, in light of insights from 
religion scholars. With these insights in mind, I then examine the Court’s 
freedom of religion case law, identify the underlying assumptions about 
religion and about certain religious groups, and unpack the consequences 
that their workings carry for the protection of applicants’ religious practices 
and the internal diversity in their religious groups. I show that, at times, the 
Court looks at these cases through lenses that make more space for lived 
 11. See Peter G. Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights, 32 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 663, 676 (2011) (arguing that “any attempt to define the scope and content of the right 
to religious liberty will necessarily involve assumptions about the underlying nature of religion itself.”).  
 12. See Carolyn Evans, Religious Freedom in European Human Rights Law: The Search for a 
Guiding Conception, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 385, 396 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn 
Evans eds., 1999) (arguing that the Court tends to privilege “the cerebral, the internal and the theologi-
cal over the active, the symbolic and the moral dimensions of religion and belief” and showing how this 
notion of religion may pose difficulties for religious groups that play greater emphasis on retaining a 
“distinctive lifestyle.”). See also Lourdes Peroni, Deconstructing “Legal” Religion in Strasbourg, 2 
OXFORD J. OF LAW AND RELIGION 1, 14 (2013). In this Article, I similarly challenge the Court’s implic-
it construction of religion as primarily a matter of internal belief and conscience given the exclusionary 
and inegalitarian implications it carries for the protection of the religious freedom of people who con-
ceive of religion as practice. 
 13. See T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of ‘‘Religion’’ in Interna-
tional Law, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 189-190 (2003).  
 14. Evans, supra note 12, at 395.  
 15. I borrow the notion of “assumption of orthodoxy” about certain religious groups from Lori G. 
Beaman. Lori G. Beaman, The Missing Link: Tolerance, Accommodation and. . . Equality, 9 CANADIAN 
DIVERSITY 16, 19 (2012); see also discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
666 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:2 
experiences of religion and internal group diversity, and at others, through 
lenses that hardly leave any room for such diversity. I conclude by sketch-
ing out some premises on which the Court should ground its analysis to 
more fully embrace the former and eschew the latter. 
I. THE LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: FRAMING THE ISSUES
Part of the debates surrounding the assessment of religious freedom 
has been traditionally couched in terms of objective and subjective ap-
proaches.16 Broadly put, an objective approach involves determining 
whether a certain act “counts” as religious practice for the purposes of legal 
protection by reference to the tenets recognized as mandatory in a particu-
lar religion (by e.g., the authoritative bodies or other members of the com-
munity).17 A subjective approach, on the other hand, relies “not on what 
others view the claimant’s religious obligations as being, but rather [on] 
what the claimant views these personal religious ‘obligations’ to be.”18
Kent Greenawalt insightfully identifies the two variables usually involved 
in the process: 
One concerns perspective; is that of the individual or the group to count? 
The other variable concerns stringency; must the behavior in which the 
claimant wants to engage. . .be required from a religious point of view, 
be a central religious practice or closely related to a central religious be-
lief, or be merely connected more weakly to religious belief or prac-
tice?”19
Either way, scholars of religion have made clear that the two tests rest 
on different understandings of religion. The objective test understands reli-
gion as, “doctrinally definite and authoritatively determined by an institu-
tional church. Being religious—exercising religion—is being obedient to 
the legal prescriptions of that religion.”20 The subjective view, on the other 
 16. For a discussion of the subjective and objective approaches in the U.S. context, see, e.g., 
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 441 (1998); Kent Greenawalt, Judicial
Resolution of Issues about Religious Conviction, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 461 (1998). In the Canadian con-
text, see e.g., Richard Moon, Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 29 
SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW 201 (2005); Robert E. Charney, How Can There Be Any Sin in Sincere? 
State Inquiries into Sincerity of Religious Belief, 51 SUP. CT. REV. 47 (2010); Solange Lefebvre, Reli-
gion in Court, Between an Objective and a Subjective Definition, in REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION:
MANAGING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY 32 (Lori G. Beaman ed., 2012). In the ECHR context, see e.g., 
CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
111-127 (2001).  
 17. See, e.g., Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (Can.) at ¶ 43. 
 18. Id. at ¶ 54.  
 19. Greenawalt, supra note 16, at 465 (identifying and unpacking the variables involved in the 
process of determining whether a claimant’s religion is “substantially burdened” in the U.S. context) 
(emphasis added).  
 20. Sullivan, supra note 16, at 446.   
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hand, imagines religion as “personally determined—a matter of individual 
choice.”21 Both tests have raised objections.22 One critique usually made 
against the objective test is that it tends to be oblivious to the difficulties of 
determining religious orthodoxy.23 Another objection is that the objective 
approach tends to “essentialize and simplify the complicated and complex 
relationships between believer, belief and practice.”24 Moreover, “in falling 
back on the majority opinion in a religious community,” this kind of ap-
proach may contribute to “the marginalization of minority voices.”25 In 
turn, a common concern raised about the subjective test is its Protestant 
bias given its focus on the individual.26 In many religious traditions, as 
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan explains, the focus is not individual belief: 
“[T]he needs and identity of the community . . . take[s] precedence and 
religious practice . . . play[s] a bigger role.”27
In fact, it seems that delving into elements of religious dogma or doc-
trine cannot be wholly avoided in freedom of religion assessments. Even 
the most subjective tests—like the sincerity-of-belief test applied by some 
courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada28—appear to have “unspo-
ken” parts that ultimately involve an assessment of religious doctrine.29 As 
21. Id.
 22. For a brief analysis of the difficulties raised by each of these approaches, see GÉRARD 
BOUCHARD & CHARLES TAYLOR Report BUILDING THE FUTURE: A TIME FOR RECONCILIATION 175-
177 (2008). See also Emmanuelle, Bribosia, Julie Ringelheim, and Isabelle Rorive, Reasonable Ac-
commodation for Religious Minorities: A Promising Concept for European Antidiscrimination Law? 17 
MAASTRICHT JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE LAW 137, 149 (2010).  
 23. Sullivan, supra note 16, at 448.  
 24. Lori G. Beaman, Defining Religion: The Promise and the Peril of Legal Interpretation, in
LAW AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN CANADA 192, 201 (Richard Moon ed., 2008).  
 25. BOUCHARD & TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 176. 
 26. Sullivan, supra note 16, at 449. The idea that it is “the individual who decides” is “a basically 
Protestant understanding of authority.” WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 133 (2005).  
 27. Sullivan, supra note 16, at 449. For critical assessments of courts’ privileging of the individual 
aspect at the expense of the collective or communal dimension, see, e.g., Benjamin Berger, Law’s 
Religion: Rendering Culture, 45 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL 277, 288 (2007) (highlighting Canadi-
an courts’ emphasis on the individual and their treatment of collective traditions and institutions as 
“only of derivative importance” when determining what counts as religious) and AVIGAIL EISENBERG,
REASONS OF IDENTITY: A NORMATIVE GUIDE TO THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF 
IDENTITY CLAIMS 107-108 (2009) (arguing that privileging individual subjective views ignores “the 
communal function” of religious practices). 
 28. A well-known example epitomizing this approach is the case of Syndicat Northcrest v. Am-
selem , [2004] 2 SCR 551 (Can.), decided by the Supreme Court of Canada.  
 29. Lori G. Beaman, Conclusion, in REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION: MANAGING RELIGIOUS 
DIVERSITY 208, 217 (Lori G. Beaman ed., 2012). See also, Lefebvre, supra note 16, at 47; EISENBERG,
supra note 27, at 108. In an analysis of several cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, 
Lefebvre points to the contradiction, between “the affirmation of the secondary character of dogma, 
doctrine and orthodoxy and the persistent reference to these aspects as criteria to judge the sincerity or 
the noneccentric nature of belief.” Lefebvre, supra note 16, at 47. In a similar vein, Avigail Eisenberg 
contends: “Even in a case like Amselem, the Canadian court relies far more heavily on assumptions and 
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Lori Beaman puts it, the question is ultimately “sincerely held belief in 
what?”30 “One must sincerely believe in something.”31 “To determine sin-
cerity,” she argues, “someone (the court, an expert, the believer) must iden-
tify a set of beliefs and practices.”32 For Beaman, and others, it is therefore 
simply impossible to separate sincerity from content.33 Avigail Eisenberg, 
for instance, contends that “it is nearly impossible for courts to avoid as-
sessing the tenets of religious faith or to base their decisions entirely on 
individual sincerity, despite their eagerness to avoid scrutiny of religious 
doctrine and traditions.”34 Eisenberg believes that this impossibility is due 
to the collective dimension often involved in religious identity claims.35 In 
reality, sometimes cases cannot be decided from a mere individual perspec-
tive; they crucially require an analysis of the group’s perspective.36
The starting point of this Article is therefore that, for the purposes of 
my inquiry, it is more fruitful to focus on the scope, variety and role of 
objective elements (e.g., requirements or precepts established in texts or by 
religious authorities, views/practices of other members of the community). 
I thus attempt to assess the space the Strasbourg Court makes for religious 
diversity and dissent within religious groups in a less dichotomous manner. 
The degree of receptiveness to applicants’ varied religious experiences—
and, therefore, to intragroup variation and dissent—may be more effective-
ly assessed by focusing on the ways in which the Court deploys objective 
elements. In other words, the issue is not so much whether the Court ap-
plies one or the other approach (subjective or objective) in a black-and-
white fashion. The issue is rather whether, in employing objective elements 
in its legal analysis, the Court emphasizes (and encourages) or obscures 
(and discourages) complexity and diversity within religious groups.  
To this end, I borrow the notions of “relatively porous” and “relatively 
dense” lenses developed by Barbara Flagg.37 In an assessment of doctrinal 
appeals to subjectivity as a strategy for pursuing pluralism in the U.S. legal 
assessments about religious dogma than would be necessary if sincerity is the real basis.” EISENBERG,
supra note 27, at 108. 
 30. Beaman, supra note 29, at 217. 
 31. Beaman, supra note 24, at 201 (emphasis added).  
 32. Id.
 33. Id. at 209. 
 34. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 27, at 108 
 35. Id.
 36. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 16, at 467 (giving as an example the case of Lyng v. North-
west Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (concerning the building of a road 
that would affect sacred sites of Native Americans)). 
 37. Barbara J. Flagg, The Algebra of Pluralism: Subjective Experience as a Constitutional Varia-
ble, 47 VAND. L. REV. 273, 331 (1994). 
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context, Flagg shows that “the lived experience of real people is always 
filtered through one objective lens or another.”38 The strategy, she claims, 
is “fraught with peril, from a pluralist perspective” because, in fact, there is 
no open articulation of the objective criteria employed to determine what 
subjective experiences “count.”39 In an effort to mitigate the anti-pluralist 
risk of this approach, Flagg develops the idea of “a continuum of objective 
filters” overlaying on subjective experiences.40 These filters range from, 
“relatively porous objective standards that operate to validate most, if not 
all, actual subjective experiences, to relatively dense requirements that 
function to exclude from further doctrinal consideration some significant 
portion of the actual range of lived experiences.”41 Pluralism, she claims, 
“is served when subjective experience is viewed through a relatively po-
rous objective filter, and it is disserved when the objective lens is relatively 
dense.”42
In this Article, I share Flagg’s concern with how objective criteria ap-
plied by courts to claimants’ lived experiences may make more or less 
space for pluralism (in my case, intragroup religious pluralism). Thus, I 
find her notions of relatively dense and relatively porous objective lenses 
and their role in serving or disserving pluralism apt for present purposes. In 
the remainder of this Article, I therefore look at the room the Strasbourg 
Court leaves for intragroup religious diversity through the types of lenses 
identified by Flagg. I believe that a frame focused on the features of the 
objective lenses employed in the analysis of religious claims rather than on 
the more dichotomous subjective/objective approaches (e.g., individu-
al/collective, individual/institutional, practice/theology) might better cap-
ture the nuance and complexity that the latter frame tends to miss. 
II. LOOKING AT INTRAGROUP DIVERSITY IN STRASBOURG THROUGH 
OBJECTIVE RELIGIOUS LENSES 
A look at the complaints filed with the Strasbourg Court reveals that 
applicants’ religious practices exhibit different degrees of conformity, if 
any, to religious dogma. Indeed, some applicants follow religiously pre-
scribed practices strictly. Other claimants engage in practices that are not 
prescribed or widely recognized. Yet others fully embrace orthodox norms 
and practices. The large majority of applicants comes to the Court as part 
 38. Id. at 318. 
 39. Id. at 323.  
 40. Id. at 331. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.
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of collectives. They present themselves as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Coptic 
Christians, Buddhists, Muslims, and Sikhs—to name just a few—bringing 
to the Court’s analysis an inescapable collective dimension. At times, they 
openly rely on the doctrines or views of institutional bodies or members of 
their religious groups in support of their claims. Some even portray their 
practices as the “core” of their group’s religious identity. Other times, ap-
plicants admit that their practices may not be required by or central to their 
religion but still claim that they express their deep commitment to it. 
One way of assessing the Court’s responsiveness to such a variety of 
religious experiences within religious groups is by focusing on how the 
Court employs objective filters in determining whether such experiences 
fall within the scope of freedom of religion. Article 9 of the ECHR guaran-
tees, among other things, the freedom to manifest one’s religion in teach-
ing, observance, practice and worship.43 One of the preliminary questions 
the Strasbourg Court asks when examining a religious freedom case is 
whether a certain act counts as a “manifestation” of the applicant’s religion 
within the meaning of this provision. The purpose of this inquiry is to de-
termine whether the act in question attracts the protection of Article 9 of 
the ECHR.44
Traditionally, the criteria employed by the Court (and by the now ex-
tinct European Commission of Human Rights) to recognize “manifesta-
tions” of religion in practice “have swung from ‘normal and recognized 
manifestations’ of the religion or belief to manifestations required by the 
religion or belief without any strong consistency.”45 In reality—and even 
though it has long been unclear whether the action in question needed to be 
“required” by the religion or simply strongly connected to it46—this ap-
 43. Article 9(1) of the ECHR states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance.” (emphasis added).  
 44. Another crucial stage in the Court’s freedom of religion analysis is the one conducted under 
Article 9(2) of the ECHR. Article 9(2) of the ECHR provides the grounds on which freedom to manifest 
one’s religion may be restricted by stating: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.” So if a claim passes all the preliminary hurdles – including the qualifica-
tion as a “manifestation” of religion – the Court proceeds to examine whether the interference with 
religious freedom is justified as “necessary in a democratic society.” The Court here checks whether the 
interference pursues a legitimate aim and, if so, whether the interference is proportionate to the legiti-
mate aim pursued. For a detailed analysis of the stages the Strasbourg Court follows in its Article 9 
analysis, see MALCOLM D. EVANS, MANUAL ON THE WEARING OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN PUBLIC 
AREAS 7-20 (2009).  
 45. Isabelle Rorive, Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a European Answer, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV.  2669, 2674 (2009) (footnote omitted). 
 46. EVANS, supra note 16, at 202.  
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proach has resulted in a distinction between “proper” manifestations of a 
religion and those acts simply inspired, motivated or influenced by it.47
In recent years, however, the Court has gradually started to “count” 
practices that, though not necessarily required by a religion, are still moti-
vated or inspired by it.48 In this way, albeit not consistently, the Strasbourg 
Court has shown itself more sensitive to forms of religion that may not 
necessarily be institutionally or textually required.49
In what follows, I identify some of the main features characterizing 
the objective filters employed by the Court in determining what “counts” as 
“manifestations” of religion for the purposes of Article 9 ECHR. Moreover, 
I assess the implications that the application of these filters may have for 
hindering or furthering religious intragroup diversity. 
A. Relatively Dense Objective Filters 
In this part, I look at two groups of cases. In the first group, the Court 
refuses to count applicants’ practices as a “manifestation” of religion be-
cause they fail to show that such practices are required by it. In the second 
set of cases, the Court counts the applicants’ practices as a “manifestation” 
of their religion largely based on essentialist understandings of group iden-
tity.  
 47. The Court has long been criticized for minimizing the scope of Article 9(1) of the ECHR by 
adopting a restrictive approach to determining what counts as a manifestation of religion or belief. See,
e.g., Malcolm D. Evans, Freedom of Religion and the European Convention on Human Rights: Ap-
proaches, Trends and Tensions, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
291, 295 (Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans and Zoe Robinson eds., 2008); EVANS, supra note 16, at 394; 
LUCY VICKERS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND THE WORKPLACE 96-100
(2008). 
 48.   See, e.g., Gatis Kovalkovs v. Latvia, App. No. 35021/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 60 (2012), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-10909931 (unpublished Court 
(Third Section) decision); Jakobski v. Poland, App. No. 18429/06, ¶ 45, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005-VI, availa-
ble at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102121; Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [GC], 
App. No. 44774/98, ¶ 78, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005-XI, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pa
ges/search.aspx?i=001-70956. However, in Kosteski v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
App. No. 55170/00, ¶ 38, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sit
es/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-73342 (unpublished Court (Third Section) decision) the Court does not 
count taking time off work to celebrate a religious holiday as a “manifestation” of the applicant’s 
Islamic faith but accepts that it was motivated by it. See EVANS, supra note 44, at 295. 
 49. The distinction between religious manifestation and religiously motivated conduct remains 
however in place in the Court’s jurisprudence. The Court has recently re-affirmed that not every act “in 
some way inspired, motivated or influenced by it constitutes a ‘manifestation’ of the belief.” Eweida 
and Others v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 48420/10, ¶ 58, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881.  
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1.  Requiring Conformity with Orthodoxy 
In a number of cases, the Court (and the former Commission) has im-
plicitly or explicitly required conformity with religious mandates or pre-
scriptions in order for practices to count as “manifestations” of religion for 
the purposes of Article 9 of the ECHR. In making the protection of appli-
cants’ freedom of religion conditional upon conformity with authoritatively 
(e.g., institutionally or textually) mandated beliefs or practices, this filter 
remains relatively closed to what religious scholars call “lived religion.” 
Lived religion, as Meredith McGuire notes, distinguishes “the actual expe-
rience of religious persons from the prescribed religion of institutionally 
defined beliefs and practices.”50 It is the kind of religion that flows into 
“everyday activities and objects” and that is “spectacularly resistant to hi-
erarchical control.”51 Robert Orsi describes lived religion in the following 
terms: 
Lived religion cannot be separated from other practices of everyday life, 
from the ways that humans do other necessary and important things, or 
from other cultural structures and discourses . . . Nor can sacred spaces 
be understood in isolation from the places where these things are done—
workplaces, hospitals, law courts, homes, and streets.52
Several cases in the Strasbourg case law illustrate the relative density 
of this type of objective filter and its incapacity to attend to lived religious 
experiences and diversity within religious groups.  One example is X. v. the 
United Kingdom (1981), a case brought by a Muslim school teacher com-
plaining that he was forced to resign from his job for not being allowed to 
take time off on Fridays to attend prayers at a nearby mosque.53 One of the 
main disputes between the parties was whether this attendance was “re-
quired by Islam and thus a ‘necessary part’ of his religious practice.”54 The 
Commission found that the applicant did not convincingly show that “he 
was required by Islam” to disregard his contractual duties and to go to the 
 50. MEREDITH B. MCGUIRE, LIVED RELIGION: FAITH AND PRACTICE IN EVERYDAY LIFE 12 
(2008). McGuire adds: “Although lived religion pertains to the individual, it is not merely subjective. 
Rather, people construct their religious worlds together, often sharing vivid experiences of that intersub-
jective reality.” Id. On lived religion, see generally, DAVID D. HALL, LIVED RELIGION IN AMERICA:
TOWARD A HISTORY OF PRACTICE (1997).  
 51. SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 140. 
 52. Robert A. Orsi, Is the Study of Lived Religion Irrelevant to the World We Live In?, 42 J. SCI.
STUDY OF RELIGION 169, 172 (2003). 
 53. X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8160/78, 22 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 27 (1981), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-74929.  
 54. Id. at 34.  
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mosque during school time.55 It added, however, that, even if such religious 
obligation were assumed, the case was anyhow inadmissible on other 
grounds.56 In another case, X. v. the United Kingdom (1974), the Commis-
sion similarly found that the applicant, a Buddhist prisoner, showed that 
communication with other Buddhists was an important part of his religious 
practice but “failed to prove that it was a necessary part of this practice
that he should publish articles in a religious magazine.”57 The applicant’s 
complaint that he was not allowed to send out articles for publication in a 
Buddhist magazine was therefore found manifestly ill-founded. 
Another, newer, case in point is Jones v. the United Kingdom 
(2005).58 The case was brought by a father banned from placing a memori-
al stone with a photograph on the grave of his daughter. His complaint was 
that the bar on photographs interfered with his religion, as the Church of 
Wales accepts photographs on graves. His practice, however, did not count 
as a “manifestation” of his religious beliefs in the sense protected by Arti-
cle 9 of the ECHR. After pointing out that it was “irrelevant for this pur-
pose that the church of which the applicant is a member permitted such 
photographs,” the Court held: “[I]t cannot be argued that the applicant’s 
belief required a photograph on the memorial or that he could not properly 
pursue his religion and worship without permission for such a photograph 
being given.”59 In the first part of this reasoning, the Court dismisses the 
relevance of institutional permission; it considers irrelevant that the Church 
of Wales permits photographs. In the next part, the Court appears to em-
phasize the relevance of institutional requirement; it suggests that, since 
placing such a photograph on the memorial is not a requirement of the ap-
plicant’s religion, the act does not fall under Article 9 protection. The sug-
gestion seems to be that the photograph has nothing do with the applicant’s 
religion: he can perfectly practice his religion without it.  The complaint 
was quickly dismissed as incompatible ratione materiae with the ECHR 
 55. Id. at 35 (emphasis added). The kind of test requiring applicants “to show that they [are] 
required to act in a certain way because of their religion or belief” has come to be known as the Ar-
rowsmith test. EVANS, supra note 16, at 115. The test “was intended to introduce an element of objec-
tivity into the determination of whether an action is a ‘practice’ for the purposes of Article 9(1).” Id. at 
203. For an analysis and critique of this test, see id. at 111-127. 
 56. X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8160/78, 22 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep., at 27, 35.  
 57. X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5442/72, 1 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 41, 42 (1974), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-74994 (emphasis added). 
 58. Jones v. United Kingdom (dec.), App. No. 42639/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70437 (unpublished Court (Fourth Section) 
decision).
 59. Id. at ¶ 3 (emphasis added). 
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provisions,60 even when many scholars of religion would agree that prac-
tices surrounding individuals’ death or that of their loved ones “are close to 
the heart of religion.”61 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, for example, emphasiz-
es the importance that “practices associated with a burial site” can have for 
religious people.62 These practices may include “placing of material objects 
symbolic of the dead person’s life.”63
Another kind of relatively dense filter can be found in D. v. France 
(1983).64 The case concerned a Jewish applicant who, in refusing to deliver 
the divorce document (“get”) to his ex-wife, was found in disagreement 
with the tenets of his religion. The Commission first noted that the appli-
cant did not allege that, in delivering the get, he would be acting against his 
religious convictions but that he would be forfeiting the possibility of re-
marrying his ex-wife.65 Next, the Commission found that the applicant’s 
refusal was “at variance on this point with the religious leaders.”66 In this 
respect, it observed that it appeared from a domestic court’s judgment that 
“under Hebrew law it is customary to hand over the letter of repudiation 
after the civil divorce has been pronounced, and that no man with genuine 
religious convictions would contemplate delaying the remittance of this 
letter to his ex-wife.”67 Based on these reasons, the Commission concluded 
that the applicant’s refusal did not count as a manifestation of his religion 
and declared his complaint manifestly ill-founded. While the first point 
made by the Commission seems sensible (the fact that the applicant’s re-
fusal to deliver the get was not actually based on his religious convictions), 
the second point appears problematic (the fact that the applicant was at 
variance with religious leaders). Indeed, the second approach is problemat-
ic because, in implicitly requiring agreement with the opinion of religious 
leaders in order to attract Article 9 protection, the Court risks marginalizing 
minority or dissenting voices within religious groups.
The rationale underlying the Court’s reasoning in D. v. France is
somehow different from the one underpinning the reasoning in the three 
 60. The subject matter of the claim did not come within the scope of the ECHR and was therefore 
rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the ECHR.
 61. SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 215. See also my analysis of the Jones case along similar lines in 
Lourdes Peroni, Deconstructing “Legal” Religion in Strasbourg, in 2 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
RELIGION 1, 14 (2013). 
 62. SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 217. 
 63. Id. at 216. 
 64. D. v. France, App. No. 10180/82, 35 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 199 (1983), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-74175. 
 65. Id. at 202. 
 66. Id.
 67. Id. As Carolyn Evans notes, this conclusion is taken from a domestic court’s decision rather 
than from expert evidence offered to the Commission. EVANS, supra note 16, at 121 n.108. 
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other cases discussed earlier. In the three previous cases, Article 9 of the 
ECHR did not protect the applicants because they sought to engage in prac-
tices seemingly not required by their religions. In D. v. France, on the oth-
er hand, Article 9 of the ECHR did not protect the applicant, in part, 
because he wanted to engage in an act viewed as contrary to the require-
ments of his religion. 
The approach adopted by the Court (and the Commission) in cases 
such as the ones examined above has been criticized for disadvantaging 
religious people who do not accept all doctrinal prescriptions of a particular 
religion or who believe that their religion places further demands on 
them.68 Moreover, this approach does not take into account that some reli-
gions “may specify a group of mandatory practices;” others, however, may 
encourage their members to “demonstrate their piety and their desire to 
achieve the holy, by engaging in practices that go well beyond any set of 
obligatory rules.”69 The kinds of filters employed in the cases discussed in 
this part do not attend to questions such as what if the practices in question 
are not endorsed by the elites, authorities or majority but only by a minority 
of the religious group of which applicants claim to be part? Or, what if 
there is internal disagreement over whether certain acts are required or 
essential to religious practice? So, one of the dangers of this approach is 
that it may lead to the rejection of claims that fall outside the mainstream of 
a religion.70 At a deeper level, the objective filters used by the Court to 
narrowly construct the notion of “manifestation” of religion seem to fit 
with an understanding of religion as “a set of theological propositions” 
rather than as “a particular way of living.”71
In sum, the filtering mechanisms that the Court (and the Commission) 
employs in the cases outlined above are normatively dense. They tend to 
favor those who conform to what is authoritatively prescribed while disem-
powering those who may disagree, those who may engage in practices pre-
scribed by only a minority within the group or those who may engage in 
practices authoritatively encouraged (or accepted). These kinds of filter 
appear to miss one crucial insight from religious studies: the fluidity of 
 68. See, e.g., EVANS, supra note 16, at 122. Moreover, the Court’s approach in cases such as the 
ones discussed in this part has been criticized for not being truly objective: the Court does not really 
look for evidence from religious leaders or communities but uses its own subjective judgment instead 
when determining the requirements of a religion. See id. at 203. 
 69. David M. Brown, Neutrality or Privilege? A Comment on Religious Freedom, 29 SUPREME 
COURT OF CANADA L. REV. 222, 226 (2005). 
 70. EVANS, supra note 16, at 123. 
 71. Evans, supra note 12, at 395. 
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religion and the dynamic character of religious traditions. As Benjamin 
Berger notes: 
Perhaps the only safely generalizable statement within religious studies 
is that religious traditions are in a constant state of change and adaptation 
in response to their surrounding social conditions. Religions are con-
stantly in flux, redefining their practices and beliefs in dialogue with 
their local, historical, and social milieus.72
Avoiding positing orthodox dogma as the sole standard of the in-
quiry73 does not necessarily mean a rejection of institutional or textual 
forms of inquiry in the analysis. In fact, attention to lived forms of religion 
does not have to involve an either-or approach. According to religious 
scholar Robert Orsi, the study of lived religion “directs attention to institu-
tions and persons, texts and rituals, practice and theology, things and ide-
as.”74
Objective elements, as argued in the previous part, are inevitable and 
substantially contribute to the assessment of religious freedom claims. 
What is crucial, though, is that in the process, courts remain aware that 
interpretations within religious groups are “multiple, contested, and con-
flicting”75 and avoid tests that encourage what Berger terms “religious 
fundamentalism,” that is to say, “a rigid or absolutist fidelity to a particular 
interpretation of a tradition.”76
2. Essentializing Religious Groups  
In recent years, the Court appears to have gradually moved away from 
approaches that explicitly or implicitly require conformity with orthodox 
doctrine when determining the scope of freedom of religion. Yet, at times, 
the Court’s essentialist views of certain religious groups based on what 
Lori Beaman calls “the assumption of orthodoxy”77 still risks hindering 
intragroup diversity. Beaman notes: 
 72. Berger, supra note 1, at 27.  
 73. As Berger also notes, making orthodox interpretation “the standard for the religious . . . would 
be to undergird existing authorities within a community by lending them the definitional support of the 
state.” Id.
 74. Orsi, supra note 52, at 172. See also Linda Woodhead, Five Concepts of Religion, 21(1) 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY - REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE 121, 133 (2011) 
(arguing that lived religion “is less interested in formal theologies and religious structures per se than in 
their relations with religious practices in ‘everyday’ life, which includes domestic, familial and leisure 
settings, as well as designated religious settings.”).   
 75. Beaman, supra note 24, at 212. See also Lefebvre, supra note 16, at 47 (warning against 
“reducing the [doctrine] inquiry to the most official dogma of the religious group in question”).  
 76. Berger, supra note 1, at 26. 
 77. Beaman, supra note 15, at 19. 
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There is a tendency when dealing with religious groups with which we 
are not familiar to essentialize them, often in orthodox ways. Thus, not 
all Muslims require prayer space, not all Sikhs wear kirpan, and so on. 
Religious groups and individuals themselves complain that such essen-
tialization is pushing them toward an orthodoxy of practice that is inap-
propriate.78
Assumptions of this sort make the filters employed by the Court to de-
termine what “counts” as a “manifestation” of religion relatively dense 
because they posit certain religious practice as the group paradigmatic 
practice and fix it as the “essence” of a certain group identity. These essen-
tialist assumptions are problematic because they tend to use certain practic-
es as the yardstick against which group membership is judged and to deny 
legal protection to those who do not conform to the standard. 
The Court has employed this kind of filter most notably in cases in-
volving Sikh applicants. One example is Mann Singh v. France (2008), a 
case concerning a Sikh man denied the renewal of his driver’s license for 
refusing to take off his turban for the picture.79 In assessing whether Mann 
Singh’s wearing of his turban falls within the scope of Article 9 of the 
ECHR, the Court says:  
According to the applicant, the Sikh faith compels its members to wear 
the turban in all circumstances. It is not only considered at the heart of 
their religion, but also at the heart of their identity. Therefore, the Court 
notes that this is an act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief.80
In the second sentence of this passage, the Court leaves out the appli-
cant and objectivizes his practice by means of a linguistic move known in 
discourse analysis as “passivization”—the use of the passive voice instead 
of the active voice.81 Indeed, the Court states that the turban (“it”) is con-
sidered to be at the heart of the Sikh religion and identity without saying 
who actually considers the turban as such.82 The context indicates that it is 
Mann Singh, the applicant himself, who views the turban this way.83 How-
 78. Id.
 79. Mann Singh v. France (dec.), App. No. 24479/07, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 5 (2008), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-89848 (unpublished Court (Fifth Section) 
decision) (author’s translation). 
 80. Id. at 5 (author’s translation) (emphasis added). 
 81. See, e.g., Michael Billig, The Language of Critical Discourse Analysis: The Case of Nominali-
zation, 19 DISCOURSE AND SOCIETY 783, 785 (2008). For an analysis of Mann Singh along similar 
lines, see Lourdes Peroni, Religion and Culture in the Discourse of the European Court of Human 
Rights: The Risks of Essentializing and Stereotyping, INT’L J.L. IN CONTEXT (forthcoming June 2014). 
 82. The Court engages in passivization by stating “the turban is considered” rather than, say, 
“Mann Singh considers the turban” Mann Singh, App. No. 24479/07, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 5. See also
Peroni, supra note 81. 
 83. A reading of Mann Singh’s application confirms that this characterization comes from the 
applicant. Referral to the European Court of Human Rights for Mann Singh 2 (June 11, 2007) (author’s 
translation) (on file with author and Chicago-Kent Law Review). See also Peroni, supra note 81. 
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ever, with the passive construction in “[the turban] is considered”—that is 
to say, with the deletion of Mann Singh as the subject—the Court separates 
the turban from its wearer and objectivizes his religious practice by repre-
senting it as though it were a “thing” or “entity” rather than a dynamic 
practice.84 Moreover, this reification of the applicant’s practice enables the 
Court to further situate “the turban” at the “heart” of the Sikh identity, in a 
move that fixes it and posits it as the defining group characteristic.85
Two forms of essentialism are at work in this mode of reasoning: (1) 
the attribution of certain characteristics to some “static ‘essence,’” in a 
move that “naturalizes differences that may be historically variant and so-
cially created” and (2) the treatment of such characteristics “as the defining 
ones for everyone in the category.”86 This kind of language (re)affirms 
intragroup exclusions and inequalities because it suggests that those who 
do not follow the “core” practice of wearing a turban—or do not follow it 
strictly—may be regarded as less members than others or, simply, as not 
members at all.87 In other cases concerning Sikhs—this time students ex-
pelled from French schools for refusing to take off their “keski” (a small 
turban) in alleged violation of the principle of laïcité—the Court has further 
reinforced the essentialist understanding of Sikh identity by stating that the 
Sikh religion imposes on its male adherents wearing the turban “in all cir-
cumstances.”88 The cases in point are Ranjit Singh v. France and Jasvir
Singh v. France.89 Mann Singh and the Sikh students may have met the 
criterion of group membership implicitly established by the Court but fu-
ture Sikh applicants not wearing the turban “in all circumstances” will most 
likely fail the test and get “stuck” in the dense filter thereby created. 
 84. On the notion of “objectivation” in critical discourse analysis, see THEO VAN LEEUWEN,
DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: NEW TOOLS FOR CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 63-66 (2008). Van 
Leeuwen explains that social actions may be objectivized in discourse when they are “represented 
statically, as though they were entities . . . rather than dynamic processes.” Id. at 63. For a more detailed 
analysis of the use of objectivation and its implications in Mann Singh, see Peroni, supra note 81. 
 85. See also Peroni, supra note 81. 
 86. Anne Phillips, What’s Wrong with Essentialism?, 20 DISTINKTION: SCANDINAVIAN J. OF SOC.
THEORY 47, 53-54, 57 (2010).  
 87. See also Peroni, supra note 81. 
 88. See, e.g., Ranjit Singh v. France, App. No. 27561/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 2 (2009), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-93702 (unpublished Court (Fifth Section) 
decision); Jasvir Singh v. France, App. No. 25463/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 6 (2009), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-93701 (unpublished Court (Fifth Section) 
decision) (author’s translation). In fact, an earlier case concerning a Sikh applicant illustrates that, back 
then, the Court already understood that the Sikh religion mandates that its male followers wear a turban. 
Phull v. France, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 419, 424 (holding, in a case brought by a Sikh asked to take off 
his turban during an airport security check, that “the Sikh religion requires its male followers to wear a 
turban”) (emphasis added). 
 89. Ranjit Singh, App. No. 27561/08, Eur. Ct. H.R.; Jasvir Singh, App. No. 25463/08, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 
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A partial and tentative explanation for why the Court ends up develop-
ing these relatively dense (essentialist) filters in cases such as Mann Sigh
points to a mix of elements. These elements include, most notably, the 
applicants’ arguments, the Court’s own assumptions of orthodoxy about 
groups with which it is not (sufficiently) familiar, and the lack of dispute in 
the case.90 Indeed, the applicants in Mann Singh, Ranjit Singh, and Jasvir
Singh relied on what appears to be mainstream views within their religions 
in support of their claims (at least, the mandatory or central character of 
their religious practices do not appear to have been contested either at the 
domestic level or before the Strasbourg Court). In other words, the validity 
of their practices as “manifestations” was not challenged.
The essentialist approach adopted by the Court in these cases was, to 
some extent, beneficial to the applicants. Indeed, it was mainly thanks to 
this approach that the Court regarded their religious practices as falling 
under the protection of Article 9 of the ECHR (the essentialist approach, 
however, played no role at later stages of the analysis and the applicants’ 
interests were ultimately defeated by those of the State). Yet, as mentioned 
earlier, this essentialist approach is inherently problematic because it might 
exclude from the scope of protection of Article 9 of the ECHR future Sikh 
applicants falling short of what the Court views as the “core” of Sikh iden-
tity. 
In conclusion, what makes the filters examined in the Sikh cases “rela-
tively dense” is the essentialist understanding of a particular religious 
group identity, that is, the view of wearing the turban as “definitional, core, 
and immutable”91 to the Sikh identity. This kind of filter does not make 
space for protecting the practices of those group members who do not stand 
close enough to the “core” defining group membership and, as a result, 
does not make room for protecting dissenting voices and intragroup diver-
sity. In fixing and naturalizing what in fact is dynamic and fluid, the Court 
misses again the kind of insight from religious studies noted by Benjamin 
Berger above.92
 90. See also Peroni, supra note 81. 
 91. Berger, supra note 1, at 27 (“If the practice is merely one mutable, though perhaps treasured, 
component of a vast constellation of interlocking symbolic expressions of a tradition (as it almost 
always is), the claim will simply not fare as well in a rights analysis as if the claimant presents the 
practice as definitional, core, and immutable.”).  
 92. Berger further cautions against “adopting tests in the law that encourage individuals or com-
munities to identify an unchanging ‘core’ in their tradition.” Id. at 28. 
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B. Relatively Porous Objective Filters 
In this part, I examine two groups of cases. In the first group, appli-
cants rely on what seems to be mainstream views within their religious 
communities. In these cases, the Court legally “counts” applicants’ reli-
gious practices based on objective elements but does not fall into the sort of 
essentialist formulations employed in the Sikh cases discussed in the previ-
ous part. In the second group of cases, the mandatory or essential character 
of the religious practices applicants seek protection of is called into ques-
tion in the course of the Strasbourg proceedings. In these cases, the Court 
recognizes, to a large degree, the applicants’ religious experiences even 
when they may not be religiously prescribed. 
1. Circumventing Essentialism 
In a number of cases brought before the Strasbourg Court, applicants 
engaged in practices that appeared to be widely shared within their groups 
(or, at least, no objection was raised in their cases as to the essential or 
mandatory character of such practices). In fact, in one of these cases the 
religious association in question intervened as a third party in the Stras-
bourg proceedings in support of the applicant’s claim.93 In these cases, the 
Court’s considerable reliance on objective filters comes natural and neces-
sary given that the applicants themselves resort to their group’s views in 
support of their religious freedom claims. The Court’s approach in these 
cases appears to reflect what Peter Edge calls a “sociological strategy” in 
determining the scope of freedom of religion.94 In employing this strategy, 
Edge explains, courts give emphasis “to what other co-religionists believe, 
and how they may behave.”95
Take for example the Court’s following formulation in Thlimmenos v. 
Greece (2000), a case concerning a Jehovah’s Witness denied access to the 
profession of accountant due to a past conviction for refusing to serve in 
the military for religious reasons: 
 93. Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. No. 23459/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., at. 23-4 (2009), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-95386 (unpublished Court (Third Section) 
decision). The third-party intervener, the European Association of Jehovah’s Christian Witnesses, 
supported a Jehovah’s Witness applicant’s claim to conscientious objection to military service in the 
following terms: Jehovah’s Witnesses is a “known Christian denomination which involve[s] devotion to 
high moral standards and include[s] a refusal to take up arms against their fellow men.” Id.
 94. Peter W. Edge, Determining Religion in English Courts, 1 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
RELIGION 402, 416 (2012). 
 95. Id. According to Edge, this is an emerging strategy employed by English courts given the 
distinctions that reliance on institutional or textual sources may create: “a distinction between the 
teachings of a religious community and the beliefs and practices of that community.” Id.
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[T]he Court notes that the applicant is a member of the Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses, a religious group committed to pacifism and that there is nothing 
in the file to disprove the applicant’s claim that he refused to wear the 
military uniform only because he considered that his religion prevented 
him from doing so.96
Consider also the following phrasing in Bayatyan v. Armenia (2011), a 
case concerning the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witnesses applicant for draft 
evasion: “The applicant in the present case is a member of Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses, a religious group whose beliefs include the conviction that service, 
even unarmed, within the military is to be opposed.”97 In the two cases, the 
Court legally “counts” applicants’ religious practices by looking at their 
group (Jehovah’s Witnesses), which is viewed as committed to pacifism or 
believes that military service is to be opposed. 
Though the two formulations turn to the applicants’ religious groups’ 
beliefs, none of them makes conformity with what is religiously mandated 
a requirement for freedom of religion claims to fall within the scope of 
Article 9 of the ECHR. Perhaps most remarkably, what makes the objective 
filters employed in these cases relatively porous is that the Court does not 
go as far as essentializing the applicants’ religious group in orthodox ways. 
It does not affirm, for example, that opposition to military service is “at the 
heart” of Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious identity. The Bayatyan formula-
tion is particularly more open, as it posits a certain religious conviction 
(opposition to military service) not as the group belief but as a group belief 
among others (“a religious group whose beliefs include”).98  These kinds of 
formulations suggest that the Court can recognize certain practices as a 
“manifestation” of religion based largely on their acceptance, recognition 
 96. Thlimmenos v. Greece, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 265, 278-79 (emphasis added). In fact, at work 
in this part of the Court’s reasoning is a mix of objective (“a religious group committed to pacifism”) 
and subjective elements (“because he considered that his religion prevented him from doing so”) (em-
phases added).
 97. Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. No. 23459/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., at. 29 (2009), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-95386 (unpublished Court (Third Section) 
decision) (emphasis added). The Court establishes in these terms that Article 9 ECHR was applicable. 
 98. Contrast these instances with formulations in other cases concerning Jehovah’s Witnesses 
where the Court, by means of sweeping generalizations, seems oblivious to intra-group religious diver-
sity. For instance, in Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, a case concerning the banning of the 
community in Russia, the Court stated: “It is a well-known fact that Jehovah’s Witnesses are a religious 
group committed to pacifism and that their doctrine prevents individual members from performing 
military service, wearing uniform or taking up weapons.” 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 38, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-99221 (unpublished Court (First Section) 
decision). Though the Court does not use essentialist language, it still presents its claim as a “fact” that 
is, moreover, “well-known.” The Court does not say by whom and how exactly this fact is actually 
“well-known.” My sense is that the sort of formulations present in Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow 
comes close to the essentialist assumptions examined in Part II.A.2. 
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or prescription by applicants’ religious groups or dogma in ways that do 
not necessarily brush away internal diversity. 
2. Lifting the Requirement to Show that Acts Are Religiously Mandated  
Three recent examples in the Court’s freedom of religion case law 
may serve to illustrate the employment of relatively porous filters in the 
second group of cases discussed in this part. The first example is Jakóbski 
v. Poland (2010), a case brought by a Buddhist prisoner complaining that 
he was refused meat-free meals; the Court said: “[T]he applicant’s decision 
to adhere to a vegetarian diet can be regarded as motivated or inspired by a 
religion and was not unreasonable. Consequently, the refusal of the prison 
authorities to provide him with a vegetarian diet falls within the scope of 
Article 9 of the Convention.”99 Another example is Gatis Kova?kovs v. 
Latvia (2012), also a case concerning the practice of religion in prison, 
where the applicant alleged, inter alia, that he was prevented from ade-
quately performing the rituals of Vaishnavism (the Hare Krishna move-
ment) as a result of the confiscation of his incense sticks.100 Taking into 
account the applicant’s complaints to domestic authorities, the response 
given to the Prison Administration by the president of the R?ga Chapter of 
the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, and the information 
given by members of the R?ga Vaishnavist congregation, the Court accept-
ed that burning incense sticks could be regarded as motivated or inspired 
by a religion.101The third and most recent example is the well-known case 
of Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, decided at the beginning of 
2013.102 The case concerned four Christian applicants wishing to manifest 
their religion at work, two of them by visibly wearing a cross around their 
necks. The Court accepted that these two applicants’ insistence on wearing 
a cross visibly was motivated by their desire “to bear witness to [their] 
Christian faith.”103
 99. Jakóbski v Poland, App. No. 18429/06, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 9, 10 (2010), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102121 (unpublished Court (Fourth Sec-
tion) decision). 
 100. Gatis Kova?kovs v Latvia, App. No. 35021/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 4 (2012) 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-109099 (unpublished Court (Third Section) 
decision).
 101. Id. at 13. 
 102. Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 48420/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881. 
 103. Id. at 33, 36. In this Article, I limit my analysis of Eweida to the cases of two of the four 
applicants, that is to say, to the cases of Ms. Eweida and Ms. Chaplin. These two applicants—a check-
in employee at British Airways and a nurse at a State hospital—complained that they were not allowed 
to wear a cross at work.  
2014] EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 683 
In one way or another, these recent judgments come to ease one of the 
hurdles standing on the way to the recognition of more lived forms of reli-
gion and intragroup diversity. This is because these judgments legally 
“count” a variety of practices without demanding that applicants show that 
such practices are required or mandated by their religions. The Court ac-
cepts the applicants’ practices as protected by Article 9 of the ECHR even 
when their religiously mandated or prescribed character is actually contest-
ed by the parties involved in the cases. 
Indeed, one notable commonality is that these three applicants’ views 
were challenged in their cases at the Strasbourg level by the Respondent 
States (based either on the opinion gathered from religious associations or 
on other sources). In Jakóbski, for example, the Polish government argued 
that vegetarianism was not “an essential aspect” of the practice of the ap-
plicant’s religion, since “the strict Mahayana school to which the applicant 
claimed to adhere only encouraged vegetarianism but did not prescribe 
it.”104 A similar argument was made by the United Kingdom in Eweida:
“[The] applicants’ desire to wear a visible cross, while it may have been 
inspired or motivated by a sincere religious commitment, [is] not a recog-
nized religious practice or requirement of Christianity.”105 In Gatis Ko-
va?kovs, in turn, the Latvian government presented information provided by 
members of the R?gaVaishnavist congregation. These members had in-
formed the domestic authorities that the obligation to observe the basic 
rituals of Vaishnavism, including the burning of incense sticks, was “condi-
tional”: burning incense sticks is not mandatory if circumstances do not 
permit it.106
In the three cases, the Court resolves the seeming tensions in favor of 
the applicants, deciding that their acts fall under Article 9 protection. 
Though the Court does place significant emphasis on the applicants’ sub-
jective views,107 it still relies on objective elements in its assessment in all 
cases, albeit to varying extents and at different stages. In Gatis Kova?kovs,
for example, the Court’s reasoning exhibits an intricate mix of approaches. 
 104. Jakóbski, App. No. 18429/06, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 9.
 105. Eweida, App. No. 48420/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., at 21. 
 106. Gatis Kova?kovs, App. No. 35021/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 4. 
 107. One indication of the Court’s attentiveness to the applicants’ views is that if often speaks of 
their “wish”, “decision” or “insistence” to avoid eating meat, worship by burning incense sticks or wear 
a cross visibly. Jakóbski, App. No. 18429/06, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 10 (“[T]he applicant’s decision to adhere 
to a vegetarian diet can be regarded as motivated or inspired by a religion.”) (emphasis added); Gatis
Kova?kovs, App. No. 35021/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 13 (“[T]he applicant’s wish to pray, to meditate, to 
read religious literature and to worship by burning incense sticks can be regarded as motivated or 
inspired by a religion.”) (emphasis added); Eweida, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., at 33 (“Ms Eweida’s insistence
on wearing a cross visibly at work was motivated by her desire to bear witness to her Christian faith.”) 
(emphasis added).  
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In the first stage of the analysis, the Court looks at both subjective and 
objective elements to count the applicant’s ritual of burning incense sticks 
as a “manifestation” of his religion. Indeed, relying on both the views of 
the applicant and of the leaders and members of his religious community, 
the Court first accepts that the applicant’s ritual amounts to a manifestation 
of religion.108 However, in the next stage—when establishing whether the 
restriction of the prison authorities on the applicant’s religious freedom was 
justified—the Court relies exclusively on the information provided by the 
R?ga Vaishnavist congregation and concludes: “[E]xcluding items (such as 
incense sticks) which are not essential for manifesting a prisoner’s religion
is a proportionate response” of the prison authorities to the need to protect 
the rights of other prisoners.109 The objective element—that is, the R?ga
congregation’s view that burning incense sticks is not mandatory if circum-
stances do not allow—thus serves to reduce the weight of the applicant’s 
interests at this stage of the analysis.110 The applicant ultimately lost the 
case. 
In Jakóbski, in turn, the Court first “counts” the applicant’s vegetarian 
practice as falling within the scope of Article 9 based primarily on the ap-
plicant’s views.111 Then, however, the Court brings up the objective di-
mension to reinforce the weight of his interests when assessing whether the 
restriction on his religious freedom was justified: “[a]ccording to the appli-
cant’s religion, he was supposed to have a simple meat-free diet.”112 The 
Court makes this statement to indicate that the applicant’s request did not 
place an undue burden on the prison administration, which simply had to 
leave out meat products from his meals. In this statement, the Court no 
longer speaks of “the applicant’s decision” to adhere to a vegetarian diet 
 108.  Gatis Kova?kovs, App. No. 35021/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 13. The Court reached this conclusion 
after clarifying that it was not its task to determine “what principles and beliefs are to be considered 
central to the applicant’s religion or to enter into any other sort of interpretation of religious questions.” 
Id. 
 109. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). I agree however with Saïla Ouald Chaib that the Court’s remarks 
on the non-essential character of the applicant’s practice could have been avoided altogether. As she 
argues “even if the Riga chapter would have stated that the burning of incense sticks is essential and 
always obliged for followers of Hare Krishna, . . . the Court would still have accepted that a limitation 
imposed on this manifestation of religion can be proportionate, namely in light of the rights of the co-
detainees not to be disturbed.” Saïla Ouald Chaib, Gatis Kovalkovs v. Latvia: The Strasbourg Court 
Keeps the Door to Reasonable Accommodation Open, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Mar. 15, 2012), 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/03/15/gatis-kovalkovs-v-latvia-the-strasbroug-court-keeps-the-
door-to-reasonable-accommodation-open/. 
 110. It appears that the Court ultimately relied on the opinion of the R?ga Vaishnavist congregation 
because the applicant did not dispute that information. Gatis Kova?kovs, App. No. 35021/05, Eur. Ct. 
H.R., at 15. The Court might have not applied this objective element so decisively if the applicant had 
explicitly stated his disagreement with the views of his religious group in R?ga.
 111. Jakóbski, App. No. 18429/06, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 9, 10. 
 112. Id. at 11.
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but of a diet he was supposed to follow according to a religion.113 In fact, 
unlike in Gatis Kova?kovs, Mr. Jakóbski’s religious community fully sup-
ported his claim. The Buddhist Mission in Poland had sent a letter to the 
prison authorities indicating that “[a]ccording to the rules, a Mahayana 
Buddhist should avoid eating meat to cultivate compassion for all living 
beings.”114 The applicant won the case because the domestic authorities 
failed to strike a fair balance between the interests of the prison administra-
tion and those of the applicant, “namely the right to manifest his religion 
through observance of the rules of the Buddhist religion.”115 In concluding 
this way, it becomes clear that the Court’s analysis did not disregard objec-
tive elements: “the rules of the Buddhist religion.” 
Finally, in Eweida, the Court counts wearing a cross visibly as a mani-
festation of the applicant’s religious belief not without drawing her subjec-
tivity back to Christianity: “Ms Eweida’s insistence on wearing a cross 
visibly at work was motivated by her desire to bear witness to her Christian 
faith.”116  Notably, however, the Court speaks of “her” Christian faith—as 
opposed to “the” Christian faith—thereby putting yet more emphasis on the 
subjective dimension.117 In fact, Eweida is arguably one of the cases in 
which the Court comes closest to a purely subjective approach. In other 
words, objective elements are hardly discernible in the Court’s reasoning. 
Ms. Eweida wins the case but the other Eweida applicant seeking to wear a 
cross visibly at work – Ms. Chaplin – loses. For the Strasbourg Court, the 
domestic courts failed to strike a fair balance of the interests at stake in the 
case of Ms. Eweida but not in the case of Ms. Chaplin.118
What is particularly relevant about Eweida for present purposes is that 
the Court explicitly states that “there is no requirement on the applicant to 
establish that he or she acted in fulfillment of a duty mandated by the reli-
gion in question.”119 As various legal commentators have noted, this state-
ment allows for a broader protection of “more individualistic 
 113. Moreover, the Court notes that the Buddhist Mission was not consulted on the issue of the 
appropriate diet, implying that such a consultation would have been desirable. Id.
 114. Id. at 2. The Buddhist Mission in Poland sent another letter to the Prison Director asking him 
to provide the applicant with a meat-free diet. Id. at 3.  
 115. Id. at 12. 
 116. Eweida, App. No. 48420/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., at 33. The Court follows a similar line of 
reasoning in the case of the other Eweida applicant wishing to wear a cross at work – Ms. Chaplin, a 
nurse working at a public hospital. However, the Court does not phrase the applicant’s wearing of her 
cross visibly as a manifestation of her “Christian faith” but of “her religious belief.” Id. at 36.  
 117. I am thankful to Saila Ouald Chaib for this point. 
 118. Eweida, App. No. 48420/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., at 35. 
 119. Id. at 30. 
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manifestations of religion.”120 The Court, however, does not mean that all 
religiously motivated or inspired acts will be protected. It makes clear that 
they will be so only if they are “intimately linked to the religion or be-
lief.”121 So, acts that are “only remotely connected to a precept of faith 
[will] fall outside the protection of Article 9 § 1.”122 In short, while the 
Court might no longer look at whether a particular act is required by an 
applicant’s religion, it will still look at whether there is a “sufficiently close 
and direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief.”123
To conclude, the three cases discussed above suggest that there is usu-
ally an intricate mix of objective and subjective factors at work in the 
Court’s overall legal reasoning to the point that at times it is hard to deter-
mine the extent to which it is the applicants’ or their religious groups’ 
views or religious precepts that matter. What is notable, though, is that the 
Court does not make adherence to a set of prescribed precepts a require-
ment for a religious claim to fall within the scope of protection of Article 9 
ECHR. The Court “counts” these applicants’ acts as “manifestations” of 
their religion, even though it sometimes uses objective elements to dimin-
ish the weight of the applicants’ interests in later stages of the analysis. Of 
equal significance is that the Court eschews essentialist assumptions of 
orthodoxy. Indeed, the Court does not portray wearing a crucifix visibly as 
being at the heart of Christianity or vegetarianism at the core of Buddhist 
religious practice. This is perhaps because the mandatory or central charac-
ter of these practices was, in one way or another, challenged in all cases by 
the Respondent States. Either way, the fact is that, as a result, the filters 
employed by the Court in these cases are porous enough to allow for pro-
tection of religious individuals who may dissent from the mainstream 
views of their religious community and who may engage in more lived 
forms of religion. 
CONCLUSION
This Article has critically assessed the European Court of Human 
Rights’ attentiveness to intragroup diversity by focusing on the ways in 
 120. Veit Bader, Katayoun Alidadi & Floris Vermeulen, Religious Diversity and Reasonable 
Accommodation in the Workplace in Six European Countries: An Introduction, 13 INT’L J. OF 
DISCRIMINATION & L. 54, 71 (2013); see also Tracey Reeves, Eweida v United Kingdom: Employment–
Discrimination–Religion, 18 COV. L.J. 136, 140 (2013) (arguing that “this potentially allows for a much 
wider and individualised recognition of what practices are protected as a manifestation of belief under 
article 9.”). 
 121. Eweida, App. No. 48420/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., at 30. 
 122. Id.
 123. Id.
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which the Court employs objective lenses to determine whether a certain 
practice legally “counts” for protection under Article 9 of the ECHR. The 
objective filters, for the most part inevitable in religious freedom claims 
given the collective dimension involved, do not have to be exclusionary as 
such. The Court should try, however, to keep these objective filters rela-
tively porous if it is to do fuller justice to applicants’ lived religious experi-
ences and diversity within their groups. 
Moving towards relatively porous objective filters requires becoming 
more critically aware of the implicit assumptions commonly underlying 
some of the filters employed in the Strasbourg freedom of religion case 
law. These background assumptions concern “religion” more generally and 
religious traditions and groups more specifically. 
Thus, in the first place, the process of adopting more relatively porous 
objective filters may require revising implicit understandings of religion as 
solely or primarily “a set of theological propositions”124 to which religious 
practitioners adhere. Carolyn Evans insightfully notes that “[s]ome reli-
gions . . . give great emphasis to the beliefs or orthodoxy as the constituting 
factor of the religion. Others do not do so or place equal emphasis on acting 
and belief.”125 As Lori Beaman argues, day-to-day religion “looks quite 
different from religious teachings on paper.”126 Adopting more relatively 
porous filters does not mean that the Court should de-emphasize institu-
tional, textual and theological elements in its analysis and emphasize indi-
viduals, rituals, practice and things instead.127 What this might mean is that 
the Court should try to embrace the terms of these “dichotomies” more 
interactively and complexly. 
In the second place, the process of adopting more relatively porous 
objective filters may involve incorporating the premise that interpretations 
of religious doctrine or dogma are always internally diverse and contest-
ed.128 In other words, the Strasbourg Court (and courts) should avoid re-
ducing its objective inquiry to “the most official dogma of the religious 
group in question” and remain aware instead “of the possible range of in-
terpretations.”129
 124. Evans, supra note 12, at 395.  
 125. Id. at 396. 
 126. Beaman, supra note 24, at 212. 
 127. Here, I echo Robert Orsi’s framing of different forms of religiosity. Orsi, supra note 52, at 
172. 
128. Beaman, supra note 24, at 212. 
 129. Lefebvre, supra note 16, at 47 (making this point in the Canadian legal context). 
